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11 Introduction
When choosing between two otherwise identical products some consumers are willing
to pay a higher price for a product with a reduced environmental impact. The price
premium paid is typically interpreted as an indication of demand for environmental
quality, a public good.1 Yet, ￿ green￿products often have di⁄erent consumptive charac-
teristics than their ￿ brown￿counterparts. A prominent example of such products are
organic food products. Their production has a reduced environmental impact but the
products themselves may have distinct quality than conventional foods. Indeed, studies
based on both surveys and actual purchasing data suggest that some consumer groups
choose organic products primarily out of a concern for animal welfare and environment
while others ￿nd organic products appealing because of health, food quality and taste
considerations.2 Di⁄erent attitudes towards the private good and the public good as-
pects of green products may also appear in voting decisions. For instance, Hamilton
et al. (2003) show that consumers may support regulation limiting pesticide use in
agriculture (a public good) even if they are not willing to pay for pesticide-free food (a
private good) and vice versa.
When the consumptive characteristics of the products are di⁄erent, as described
above, environmental policy may treat people di⁄erently not only because consumers
value a better environment di⁄erently but also because some consumers consume more
of the related private product than others. For instance, if demand for a green products
1See, e.g., Wasik (1996), Blend and van Ravenswaay (1999), Teisl et al. (1999), Bjorner et al. (2004).
The di⁄erent reasons behind environmentally conscious purchasing behavior and its implications for
policy-making have been studied by Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Brekke et al. (2003), and Bruvoll and
Nyborg (2004), among others.
2See e.g. Millock et al. (2004) and Wier and Calverley (2002), Thompson and Kidwell (1998)
and the references therein. However, not all consumers think that organic products are ￿ better￿than
conventional products. The perception that organic products might be safer and more ￿ natural￿than
conventional counterparts appeals to certain consumer groups, whereas other groups are interested in
the health bene￿ts o⁄ered by highly processed foods that are rich in ￿ arti￿cial￿minerals and vitamins.
(See Ippolito 2003).
2is greater among high-income consumers, encouraging consumption of this product may
channel bene￿ts to groups that are already well o⁄ in the society. It is important to
study voting behavior with regard to environmental policy when consumption of green
products and distribution of income are intertwined.
There are only a few papers that examine the implications of income distribution
on environmental policies preferred by the majority of consumers.3 Eriksson and Pers-
son (2003) show that if private products and environmental quality are both normal
goods, more equal income distribution generates less pollution. Marsiliani and Ren-
str￿m (2002) reach a similar conclusion in a quite di⁄erent setting: a marginal increase
in inequality starting from a completely egalitarian income distribution lowered the pol-
lution tax accepted by the majority. McAusland (2003) in turn considers an economy
that produces dirty and clean products and where agents have heterogenous endow-
ments of capacities to produce the products. An increase in a voter￿ s share of the
capacity to produce either clean or dirty products may make him prefer a weaker envi-
ronmental policy. There are two e⁄ects working in opposite directions: the traditional
income e⁄ect, which increases the demand for all normal goods (including the environ-
ment) and a terms of trade e⁄ect that makes dirty products more expensive. While
recognizing income inequality, none of these studies analyzes how distinct preferences
for a public good and the consumptive characteristics of green products a⁄ect policy
choices.4
The aim of this paper is to study policies designed to encourage demand for green
products under joint production of a private and public good using organic food prod-
3In contrast, there is an extensive literature on the distribution of bene￿ts and costs of environmental
regulation. A typical issue analyzed is whether environmental taxes are regressive. For instance, West
(2004) and West and Williams (2004) have studied the cost distribution of alternative policies for
reducing vehicle pollution, and Brooks and Sethi (1997) have examined the bene￿t distribution of
reducing air toxics. See also Metcalf (1999) and the references therein.
4In Eriksson and Persson (2003), voters di⁄er in how much they value environmental quality, but it
is assumed that the orderings of individuals are identical in the two dimensions of income and perceived
environmental quality; the rich always experience higher environmental quality than the poor.
3ucts as example. Our main interest is in how income and preference heterogeneities
in￿ uence policy-making. Our model is simple, yet powerful enough to allow us to an-
alyze the demand for organic products when consumers value the environmental ben-
e￿t (public good) associated with organic products equally but value the consumptive
characteristics of the organic and conventional products di⁄erently. Consumers di⁄er
in disposable income and will be classi￿ed on this basis as either rich or poor. In our
model, either group may have stronger preferences for the consumptive characteristics
of organic products. We also extend previous analyses by considering two alternative
policy instruments: a price subsidy for organic products and a tax on conventional prod-
ucts. As consumers have di⁄erent income levels and preferences, the tax and subsidy
schemes will treat the consumer segments di⁄erently. The comparison of the di⁄erent
instruments is of utmost importance for policy design as support for organic products
frequently appears on political agendas (COM (2004) 415 ￿nal).
We ￿rst derive and discuss the socially optimal subsidy and tax levels. We then
use the median-voter approach to illustrate the role of distributional issues and prefer-
ence heterogeneity in environmental regulation when policy choices are contingent on
acceptance by the majority of voters. Our results indicate that if there are no income
di⁄erences among consumers and the intervention is carried out by a welfare maxi-
mizing government, a commodity tax and a subsidy are equally good choices for the
consumers. However, if there are income di⁄erences, rich consumers prefer a socially
optimal subsidy for the organic products to a tax on conventional products while poor
consumers prefer a tax on conventional products. It is noteworthy that this result is
independent of preferences with respect to organic products. In addition, the results
show that the tax and subsidy rates which the median voter would impose tend to be
higher than the socially optimal ones if income disparity is substantial.
In the following section, we present the modelling framework. In section 3, we study
alternative economic instruments that are socially optimal. In section 4, we contrast
socially optimal policies with politically determined policies. Section 5 concludes.
42 The set-up
We consider consumers that di⁄er in two characteristics: level of income and preference
for organic products. Total population is normalized to one and consists of two di⁄erent
groups. The proportion of rich consumers in the population is ￿ and the proportion
of poor consumers is 1 ￿ ￿. As we wish the income distribution to have the realistic
feature that mean income in the economy is higher than median income, we assume that
￿ < 1￿￿. We denote the gross income of a consumer in group i by wi for i = ￿;1￿￿
, with w￿ ￿ w1￿￿.5 In addition, let w = ￿w￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)w1￿￿ denote average gross
income.
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of a conventional product, c, and
an organic product, h. The marginal utility derived from the consumption of one
additional unit of the organic product is not the same for the two consumer groups.
The preferences of the two groups are represented by the quasilinear utility functions
u￿ = c￿ +
lnh￿
￿
+ B
￿
h
￿
(1)
and
u1￿￿ = c1￿￿ + ￿ lnh1￿￿ + B
￿
h
￿
; (2)
where the degree of di⁄erence in preferences is captured by the parameter ￿. When
￿ 6= 1, the consumers do not value the private bene￿t generated by consumption of
the organic product in the same manner. When 0 < ￿ < 1, the rich consumers value
the consumption of the organic product more than the poor do. When ￿ > 1, the
preferences become reversed and the marginal utility of the consumption of the organic
product is higher for the poor. This formulation implies that if the valuation of one
group increases, the valuation of the other group necessarily decreases; however, this is a
convenient assumption as it allows us to focus on the degree of preference heterogeneity
which disappears when ￿ approaches unity.
5As a benchmark, we will consider the situation where there are no income di⁄erences. Even in
that case, we will call those in group ￿ rich consumers and those in group 1 ￿ ￿ poor consumers.
5The last term in (1) and (2) denotes the positive externality, or public good, gener-
ated by consumption of the organic product. The amount of public good is determined
by the aggregate consumption of the organic product, h = ￿h￿+(1 ￿ ￿)h1￿￿. In what
follows, we assume that the marginal utility of public good provision is a constant, i.e.
B
￿
h
￿
= bh.
The budget constraint of a consumer in group i is
b wi = pcc + phh for i = ￿;1 ￿ ￿;
where b wi denotes the disposable income of a consumer in group i. The price of the
conventional and organic products are denoted by pc and ph, respectively, net of possible
subsidies and taxes.
We assume that each consumer takes the aggregate consumption of organic product
as given when choosing how much of each product to consume. Hence, the demand for
the organic product in each group is
h￿ =
pc
ph￿
and h1￿￿ =
pc￿
ph
. (3)
Demand for the conventional product is determined as a residual and is
ci =
b wi ￿ phhi
pc
for i = ￿;1 ￿ ￿:
3 Socially optimal environmental policy
We consider two alternative policy instruments for promoting demand for the organic
product. We ￿rst study the e⁄ects of a price subsidy for the organic product and
then of a tax on the conventional product. The subsidy for the organic product is
assumed to be ￿nanced by an income tax, and the tax revenue collected from taxing
the conventional product is distributed back to the consumers as lump-sum transfers.
As the two consumer groups have di⁄erent income levels and di⁄erent preferences, these
two schemes will treat the consumers in the two groups di⁄erently.
6In what follows we normalize the price of the conventional product to one and let
ph = p in the absence of taxes and subsidies. In the social optimum re￿ ecting both the
private and public good components, the marginal social bene￿t of one additional unit of
the organic product must equal the marginal cost of the organic product, p. Therefore,
in order to obtain a meaningful solution to the welfare maximization problem of the
government, it must be that p > b. Throughout the analysis, we assume that this is
the case.
3.1 Subsidy for the organic product
Under the subsidy scheme, the prices are ph = p ￿ s and pc = 1. The subsidy is
￿nanced by an income tax and hence b wi = (1 ￿ ￿)wi, where ￿ is the income tax rate.
The government budget constraint is then
￿w = sh
s
(s) , ￿ =
sh
s
(s)
w
,
where h
s
(s) denotes the aggregate demand under the subsidy scheme.
From (3) we have that the demand for the organic product for the two consumer
types are
h
s
￿ (s) =
1
(p ￿ s)￿
and h
s
1￿￿ (s) =
￿
(p ￿ s)
(4)
and the demand for the conventional product for type i is
c
s
i (s) =
 
1 ￿
sh
s
(s)
w
!
wi ￿ (p ￿ s)h
s
i (s). (5)
The aggregate demand for the organic product is h
s
(s) =
￿
￿ +(1￿￿)￿
(p￿s) .
The indirect utility for the di⁄erent consumer types is given by
v
s
￿ (s) =
1
￿
lnh
s
￿ (s) + c
s
￿ (s) + bh
s
(s) (6)
and
v
s
1￿￿ (s) = ￿ lnh
s
1￿￿ (s) + c
s
1￿￿ (s) + bh
s
(s). (7)
7Taking into account that the rich consumers constitute fraction ￿ of population and
the poor consumers fraction 1 ￿ ￿, the aggregate welfare may be written as
W
s = ￿v
s
￿ (s) + (1 ￿ ￿)v
s
1￿￿ (s).
Using equations (4) and (5), the aggregate welfare can be reformulated as
W
s =
￿
￿
￿
ln
1
(p ￿ s)￿
￿ 1
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
ln
￿
(p ￿ s)
￿ 1
￿
+ w ￿ sh
s
(s) + bh
s
(s).
The problem of the government is to choose s to maximize the aggregate welfare. The
￿rst-order condition for welfare maximization is
@W s
@s
= (b ￿ s)
@h
s
(s)
@s
= 0.
Therefore, the socially optimal subsidy for the organic product is simply so = b, where
the superscript o refers to a socially optimal subsidy.6
Solving for the demand for the organic product for the two groups gives
h
s
￿ (s
o) =
1
(p ￿ b)￿
and h
s
1￿￿ (s
o) =
￿
(p ￿ b)
, (8)
with the socially optimal aggregate demand then
h
s
(s
o) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
(p ￿ b)
.
3.2 Tax on the conventional product
In the case of a tax on the conventional product, ph = p and pc = 1+t. We assume that
the tax revenue is distributed back to consumers as a lump-sum transfer, T. Hence,
the disposable income of a consumer in group i is b wi = wi + T and the government
budget constraint is
T = tc
t (t);
where superscript t refers to the tax scheme and ct (t) = ￿ct
￿ (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)ct
1￿￿ (t).
6It is straightforward to show that the second-order condition for welfare maximization is satis￿ed
and so = b therefore constitutes a global maximum.
8We proceed here as in the previous subsection: we ￿rst solve for the demand for
organic and conventional product as a function of the tax rate and then analyze the
welfare maximization problem of the government.
The demands for the organic product again follow directly from (3) and are
h
t
￿ (t) =
1 + t
p￿
and h
t
1￿￿ (t) =
￿ (1 + t)
p
. (9)
Using the demands for the organic product and the budget constraints, we can
express the aggregate demand for the conventional product as
c
t (t) = w ￿ ph
t
(t); (10)
where h
t
(t) = 1+t
p
￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
. Therefore, consumption of the conventional prod-
uct in group i is
c
t
i (t) =
wi + t
￿
w ￿ ph
t
(t)
￿
￿ pht
i
1 + t
: (11)
Under the tax scheme, the indirect utility for the respective consumer types is:
v
t
￿ (t) =
1
￿
lnh
t
￿ (t) + c
t
￿ (t) + bh
t
(t) (12)
and
v
t
1￿￿ (t) = ￿ lnh
t
1￿￿ (t) + c
t
1￿￿ (t) + bh
t
(t). (13)
Combining these indirect utilities and using equations (9) and (11), we again obtain
the aggregate welfare,
W
t = ￿v
t
￿ (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)v
t
1￿￿ (t)
=
￿
￿
￿
ln
1 + t
p￿
￿ 1
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
ln
￿(1 + t)
p
￿ 1
￿
+ w ￿
pt
1 + t
h
t
(t) + bh
t
(t):
The problem of the government is to choose t to maximize aggregate welfare. The
￿rst-order condition for welfare maximization is7
@W t
@t
=
￿
b
p
￿
t
1 + t
￿￿
￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
= 0;
7Again @
2W
t
@t@t < 0 for all t.
9whereby the socially optimal tax rate is
t
o =
b
p ￿ b
where again superscript o refers to the socially optimal tax rate.
3.3 Comparison of the two regimes
We are now ready to compare the two regimes. It should be noted here that neither
the socially optimal tax nor subsidy depends on the preference heterogeneity in the
economy: the public good is valued in the same manner by all consumers and the pref-
erence heterogeneity is related only to the private bene￿t derived from the consumption
of the organic product. As the optimal policies are designed to internalize the positive
externality associated with organic production, the heterogeneity does not a⁄ect them.
We also have that
Proposition 1 Both instruments can be used to achieve ￿rst-best level of consumption
of the organic product.
Proof. Implementation of to or so leads to
h
s
(s
o) = h
t
(t
o) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
(p ￿ b)
.
If the government were to impose a level of consumption on both consumer groups that
maximizes aggregate welfare, it would choose h￿ and h1￿￿ that maximize
￿
￿
w￿ ￿ ph￿ +
lnh￿
￿
+ bh
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
w1￿￿ ￿ ph1￿￿ + ￿ lnh1￿￿ + bh
￿
.
Solving for the optimal demands leads directly to the same result.
This is a usual Pigouvian result establishing that both a tax and a subsidy can
yield an environmentally optimal outcome. The policy instruments are not equivalent,
however, as they have dissimilar impacts on the distribution of income. Using the
indirect utility functions and optimal policies we obtain
10Proposition 2 With no income di⁄erences, the consumers are indi⁄erent between the
instruments. With income di⁄erences, the rich prefer a subsidy for the organic product
and the poor prefer a tax on the conventional product.
Proof. By inserting the socially optimal subsidy and tax rate into the indirect utility
functions (6), (7), (12) and (13), we establish that
v
t
￿(t
o) ￿ v
s
￿(s
o) =
b
p
(
w￿
_
w
￿ 1)
￿
ph
o
￿ w
￿
and
v
t
1￿￿(t
o) ￿ v
s
1￿￿(s
o) =
b
p
(
w1￿￿
_
w
￿ 1)
￿
ph
o
￿ w
￿
.
Clearly, when w￿ _
w =
w1￿￿ _
w = 1,
v
t
￿(t
o) ￿ v
s
￿(s
o) = v
t
1￿￿(t
o) ￿ v
s
1￿￿(s
o) = 0:
Note that we must have w￿ph
o
> 0. Hence, vt
￿(to)￿vs
￿(so) < 0 and vt
1￿￿(to)￿vs
1￿￿(so) >
0 when w￿ _
w > 1 and
w1￿￿ _
w < 1.
When there is no income heterogenity, the choice of policy instrument is not of a
concern for the consumer. The reason for this is that both the subsidy and the tax
correct the consumption of organic food to the socially optimal level.
Since the demand for the organic product is the same with a socially optimal subsidy
and a socially optimal tax, any preference for one instrument over the other must result
from di⁄erences in the consumption levels of the conventional product. Let us consider
￿rst the rich. Their consumption levels of the conventional product under a socially
optimal tax and subsidy are
c
t
￿(t
o) =
w￿ (p ￿ b)
p
￿
1
￿
+
b
p
￿
w ￿ ph
o￿
and
c
s
￿(s
o) = w￿ ￿
1
￿
￿
bh
o
w￿
_
w
,
respectively.
11A straightforward comparison of these equations shows that cs
￿ (so) > ct
￿(to). That
is, under the subsidy scheme, the consumption of the conventional product is always
higher than under the tax scheme. In contrast, for the poor we have
c
t
1￿￿(t
o) =
w1￿￿ (p ￿ b)
p
￿ ￿ +
b
p
￿
w ￿ ph
o￿
c
s
1￿￿(s
o) = w1￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
bh
o
w1￿￿
_
w
:
These two equations may be used to show that ct
1￿￿ (to) > cs
1￿￿(so). That is, the
consumption of the conventional product by the poor is higher under the tax scheme.
It is important to notice that preference heterogeneity, determined by ￿, only mat-
ters for the absolute level of consumption in these two groups; it does not a⁄ect the
optimal policy. The key is the transfer mechanism: when the tax is set at the socially
optimal level and the revenue from taxing the conventional product is returned to the
consumer in a lump-sum manner, the poor always gain more than if a socially optimal
subsidy is paid on the organic product.
All the results derived above apply to socially optimal policies. However, if the con-
sumers prefer one instrument to the other when the subsidy or tax is chosen optimally,
it is certainly plausible that they prefer some other tax rate or subsidy to the socially
optimal ones. Accordingly, in the following section we consider what kind of outcome
a democratic voting process would generate.
4 Politically determined environmental policy
The mechanism of collective decision-making we consider here is direct voting. Since we
only have two di⁄erent consumer groups, the voting problem is very easy to characterize:
the politically determined subsidy and tax rate will coincide with the preferred policy
of the larger group. As we assume that the poor are more numerous than the rich, it
follows that the poor are decisive in the political process. We therefore have a unique
solution to the voting problem if the policy preferences of the poor have the properties
@2vt
1￿￿(t)
@t@t < 0 and
@2vs
1￿￿(s)
@s@s < 0. It is straightforward to show that
@2vt
1￿￿(t)
@t@t < 0. However,
12in order to guarantee that
@2vs
1￿￿(s)
@s@s < 0, we must assume that b
p <
w1￿￿
w . Note that
since b
p < 1, this inequality is satis￿ed provided that the income di⁄erence is not too
large relative to the social value of the organic product.
4.1 Subsidy for the organic product
In order to determine the equilibrium subsidy, we must ￿rst describe the policy pref-
erences of the two consumer groups. The policy preferences are given by the indirect
utilities of the two consumer groups determined in equations (6) and (7). Solving for
the majority preferred subsidy level gives:
Proposition 3 If the rich value the organic product substantially more than the poor
relative to the di⁄erence in their incomes, the subsidy will be lower than is socially
optimal. Otherwise, the subsidy will be higher than is socially optimal.
Proof. Let us denote by s￿ the subsidy preferred by the majority. Then s￿ is implicitly
determined by
@vs
1￿￿ (s)
@s
= h
s
1￿￿ (s) ￿
w1￿￿
w
 
h
s
(s) + s
@h
s
(s)
@s
!
+ b
@h
s
(s)
@s
= 0,
where h
s
(s) =
￿
￿ +(1￿￿)￿
(p￿s) . Taking into account (4), we obtain
s
￿ = p(1 ￿ ￿￿) + b￿;
where ￿ =
w1￿￿
w and ￿ =
￿
￿ +(1￿￿)￿
￿ . If ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1), then ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1). Clearly, when
either ￿ < 1 or ￿ 6= 1, we have s￿ 6= so. Note that
s
￿ > s
o , p(1 ￿ ￿￿) + b￿ > b:
Since p > b, this holds true when ￿ > 1.
When ￿ < 1, an increase in preference heterogeneity increases ￿. Rearranging the
terms yields
s
￿ < s
o ,
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
>
b
p
:
13Hence, if ￿ is low enough, s￿ < so.
Let us ￿rst discuss in more detail the situation where there are no di⁄erences in
preferences but income inequality prevails (￿ < 1). In such a case, it directly follows
that
s
￿
￿=1 > s
o.
With no preference heterogeneity, the groups consume the same amount of the organic
product. A subsidy for the organic product therefore bene￿ts both groups equally.
However, most of the tax burden falls on the rich, and the subsidy level di⁄ers from
the social optimum solely due to the redistributional objective of the poor. The more
unequal the distribution of income is, the higher will be the politically determined
subsidy.
If, in turn, there is no income heterogeneity (￿ = 1) but di⁄erent consumers value
the organic product di⁄erently (￿ 6= 1), the politically determined subsidy will be lower
than the socially optimal subsidy if the rich value the organic product more than the
poor. The rationale for this claim is the following. Since all consumers have the same
income level, the tax burden involved in ￿nancing the subsidy for the organic product
is equally distributed. The main bene￿ciaries of the intervention would be consumers
in group ￿ (￿ the rich￿ ) because they consume the organic product more than those in
group (1 ￿ ￿) (￿ the poor￿ ). As a result, the majority, consisting of the poor, will vote
for a lower subsidy. For the very same reason, the politically determined subsidy will
also be higher than the social optimum if the poor value the organic product more than
the rich do.
When both types of heterogeneities are present, the outcome depends on the rel-
ative importance of the two. In particular, only if the rich value the organic product
su¢ ciently more than the poor relative to the di⁄erences in income between the groups
will the majority prefer a suboptimally low subsidy.
144.2 Tax on the conventional product
The policy preferences are given by the indirect utilities of the two consumer groups
determined in equations (12) and (13). Solving again for the tax level preferred by the
majority yields:
Proposition 4 The politically determined tax rate will be lower than is socially opti-
mal if the rich value the organic product substantially more than the poor relative to
the di⁄erence in their incomes. Otherwise, the tax rate will be higher than is socially
optimal.
Proof. The tax level preferred by the majority is determined by
@vt
1￿￿ (t)
@t
=
w ￿ w1￿￿
(1 + t)2 +
￿
(1 + t)
￿ (
￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)(1 ￿
b
p
) = 0.
Solving for the tax rate yields
t
￿ =
￿￿ ￿
q
￿
2 + 4(￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)(1 ￿ b
p)(w ￿ w1￿￿)
￿2(￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)(1 ￿ b
p)
￿ 1.
Let ’ = 4(￿
￿ +(1 ￿ ￿)￿)(1￿ b
p)(w ￿w1￿￿) ￿ 0. Since
p
￿
2 + ’ ￿ ￿, we must rule out
one of the solutions as we wish to concentrate on positive tax rates. Hence,
t
￿ =
￿ +
p
￿
2 + ’
2(￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)(1 ￿ b
p)
￿ 1 (14)
Since
@’
@(w￿w1￿￿) > 0, increasing income di⁄erences tend to increase the politically de-
termined tax on the conventional product. Recall that to = b
p￿b. If ￿ = 1 but ￿ < 1,
(14) becomes
t
￿
￿=1 =
1 +
p
1 + ’
2(1 ￿ b
p)
￿ 1
and we have
t
￿
￿=1 > t
o ,
1 +
p
1 + ’
2(1 ￿ b
p)
>
p
p ￿ b
,
p
1 + ’ > 1:
15When there are no income di⁄erences, ’ = 0. The tax rate is then
t
￿
￿=1 =
p ￿ ￿(p ￿ b)
￿(p ￿ b)
and we have that
t
￿
￿=1 > t
o , p ￿ ￿(p ￿ b) > ￿b.
Therefore, t￿
￿=1 > to if ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1) and vice versa.
Consider again the situation where there is no preference heterogeneity but the
distribution of income is not equal. It follows directly that the tax rate on the conven-
tional product is too high relative to the socially optimal tax rate. Again, this happens
because of the distributional objective of the poor: the rich consume more the conven-
tional product than the poor because of their larger budget; the tax burden falls mostly
on the rich but the tax revenue is equally distributed to all consumers.
When there are no income di⁄erences, the politically determined tax rate will be
lower (higher) than the socially optimal tax rate if ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1). The reason is
the same as under the subsidy scheme: when the majority of consumers consume the
conventional product more (less) than the minority, they prefer a lower (higher) tax
rate on the consumption of the conventional product.
Again the relative importance of the two types of heterogeneities determines how
much the politically determined tax di⁄ers from the socially optimal one. Large income
di⁄erences tend to increase the equilibrium tax. The e⁄ect of large di⁄erences in pref-
erences depends on whether it is the poor or the rich who value the organic product
more.
5 Discussion
We have investigated the political desirability of using economic instruments in envi-
ronmental policy in a setting where heterogeneity of both income and preferences for
the consumptive characteristics of green products are taken into account. As an exam-
ple of a green product we used organic products, whose promotion may have important
16distributional implications given that consumers with low income spend relatively more
of their income on agricultural products than those with high income.
Although both subsidies and taxes can be used to reach a socially optimal outcome
in consumption, in the presence of income inequality consumers are not indi⁄erent with
regard to the two instruments. Those with high income prefer a subsidy for organic
products to a tax on conventional products while those with a low income prefer a
tax on conventional products to a subsidy for organic products. This result does not
depend on preferences for organic products.
To gain more understanding of the distributional impacts of the environmental poli-
cies, we examined how the preference heterogeneity a⁄ects policies preferred by the
majority. Large income disparities tend to increase both the equilibrium subsidy level
and the equilibrium tax rate. The e⁄ect of the preference heterogeneity on the level of
policy instruments naturally depends on which group values the organic product more.
If the high-income consumers are main consumers of organic products and income
di⁄erences are large, the majority preferred tax and subsidy may be lower than is
socially optimal. Otherwise, that is, if the consumers with low income value the organic
product more or if the di⁄erences in preferences are relatively small compared to income
di⁄erences, both the majority preferred tax and the subsidy are unambiguously higher
than is socially optimal. This result runs counter to the common ￿nding in earlier
studies that low-income consumers prefer laxer environmental policies than high-income
consumers. The explanation here is that environmental policy is used as a method for
redistributing income from those with high income to those with low income.
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